Ironically, this systemic parsimony has made the NHS steadily more inefficient: equipment breaks down, inefficient or obsolete equipment is not replaced, arrangements are not replaced, poor working conditions and pay contribute to high staff turnover, and a growing number of people opt out of the system through private insurance whenever they can. Thus the government is running down what many used to perceive as a competent, inexpensive, universal health care system. The alternative private system will be much more expensive. These private costs, however, will not show up on the bills that the government pays.
To summarise, the restructuring of a system that delivers more services per million pounds than any other on the grounds that it does not do so seems insane. Were the cost of the NHS £45bn and rising at 5% over inflation it would be understandable why the government thought it had a problem; but with NHS costs at £30bn, rising at 2% over inflation, the question is why do British leaders think they can treat the nation's ill for a third less than anyone else?
Although the governmnent apparently intends the reforms to make the NHS more efficient, their latent function is to transfer the political heat of parsimony from politicians to managers and doctors in the guise of 'inefficiency." As the government has not been able to take the political heat of closing down a couple of London hospitals or making consultants more accountable to the public's needs, it is using competitive contracts to pit the players against one another and let them do the job.
This political benefit, however, will be shortlived; for the basic shift from leaving allocation in the hands of physicians to rationalising care through outcomes, audits, and protocols destroys the buffer of professional discretion which has served so well to protect government from being accountable for how money is spent. This does not mean that variations in practice should not be reduced, outcomes measured, or costs calculated-only that politically the veil of professional discretion will no longer be there to hide behind.
By pointing out the overall "efficiency" of the NHS compared with other systems I do not The point is that "inefficiency" here is a useless, even misleading, term, as is the credo, "Competition produces efficiency." Without thinking through the sociological dynamics of waiting and how they should change, competition will just shuffle around who waits longer and who waits less.
Hand to mouth policy?
With this overview we can turn to the new emphasis on purchasing. Looked at from a longer perspective, this emphasis is merely the latest in a series of hand to mouth shifts as the nation's leaders try to correct one error or imbalance after another resulting from the powerful and dangerous market forces they have unleashed. These leaders have put themselves in the position of being the "rules committee" of a new game in which they also serve as the recruiters, trainers, and coaches for both sides as well as the referees of the game as it is being played.
To this observer, then, the reforms began as dictated competition, a troubling concept from Eastern Europe. "When we say go, you will start to compete.... GO" Then, almost as soon as the game began, the rules committee realised the dislocations that could arise from what the first round of contracts would leave out and ordered that all arrangements must be the same as before, only in the form of contracts. While the committee sees this move as simply delaying the game to give the players more time to hone their skills, it has the effect of locking in to the first round of contracts the old arrangements they were intended to overthrow. Although change is happening, this greatly reduces its scope. "Smooth takeoff' and "seamless transition" are phrases whose meaning boils down to "pleasing providers who might cause upset."
Next, the word "contract" seemed dangerouslv powerful; so the committee changed the term to "agreement" and then to "commissioning." No one is quite sure what "commissioning" means (unless it means contracting), and the committee is still searching for better language. The question is whether the words change much or whether they are like all the pads added to American football as it developed: it's still a game of tackle, preferably hard and low. But the intent is to create consensus management-an echo of the mid-1970s.
Then, when the rules committee started to recruit for their all-star first team of self governing trust hospitals to show the nation how terrific the new game of "Medicine through markets" could be, most of the first draft turned in weak or even financially unsound business plans.' So the committee quickly changed the rules and tightened the financial reins on the trusts to the point that some trust executives are no longer sure what being a trust hospital means.
The national draft for general practitioner budget holders has worked better because it has been confined to the largest practices with good management skills. Budget holding has given these practitioners the power to demand more prompt and better specialty services for their patients and even to restructure arrangements between themselves and specialists. However, distortions are close at hand. Budget holders have a natural monopoly over their lists and can use their budgets to extend their monopoly power vertically, by forming corporations from which they buy the specialty services.'0 On the contracting side, most general practitioners lack good data on the actual services their patients need or use, so they are contracting somewhat in the dark. Finally, they buy only a limited list of services for just their patients, thereby disrupting the mandate of the district health authorities to purchase for the needs of the entire population. We can expect the rules committee to alter this part of the game in the not too distant future.
The problem that contracts lead to discrimination is bubbling up as an issue. One kind is the extracontractual referral. General practitioners worry that their patients whom contracts have made into extracontractual referrals may not get the specialty care they need. If they do, hospitals worry that not all such referrals are being registered on their books and that therefore they will not get paid. District health authorities worry that as purchasers they are paying for extracontractual referrals that were created for the record. Extracontractual referrals reflect a core problem that arises when a national delivery system is broken up into contracts.
Contracts also imply preferential treatment for patients whose sponsor wields a financial stick over consultants, and when this issue arose the secretary of state initially indicated that such was the natural power and benefit of contracting. Objections intensified, however, not from the consumers (patients), who would be left to wait longer, but from consultants who disliked being put in such a position (as if they had never done so before); and in a major concession that further weakens the original model, the "rules committee" recently agreed joint guidance with the Joint Consultants Committee (though in somewhat "weasly" terms as one observer put it), that the contracts of one purchaser are not to "disadvantage the patients of other purchasers."" BMJ VOLUME 303
7 
